NYLS Journal of Human Rights
Volume 15
Issue 3 VOLUME XV SPRING 1999 PART THREE

Article 8

Spring 1999

A DUAL STRIFE: PRINTZ V. UNITED STATES AND ITS EFFECT ON
FEDERALISM AND THE BRADY ACT
Bianca Soprano

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Soprano, Bianca (1999) "A DUAL STRIFE: PRINTZ V. UNITED STATES AND ITS EFFECT ON FEDERALISM
AND THE BRADY ACT," NYLS Journal of Human Rights: Vol. 15 : Iss. 3 , Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights/vol15/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NYLS Journal of Human Rights by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

A Dual Strife: Printz v. United States and Its Effect on
Federalism and the Brady Act

INTRODUCTION

Federalism:' a constitutional issue that has been revisited over
and over again for the past 150 years still leaves us grappling to
define the reach of congressional powers.2
From this history
federalism emerges in two ways.' Either Congress has exercised its
given powers subject to the limitations contained in Article I' of the
Constitution, or the Tenth Amendment 5 likewise restrains the power
of Congress from infringing upon state sovereignty. Although the
text of the Tenth Amendment does not restrain the power of Congress
on its face, it reserves power to the states, thereby placing limits on
the power of the Federal Government.7 It is the sacred division
I BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990) (defining federalism as a
term which includes interrelationships among the states and relationships between the
states and the federal government).
2 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992). Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor commented, "at least as far back as Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the Court has
resolved questions 'of great importance and delicacy' in determining whether particular
sovereign powers have been granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government or
have been retained by the states. Id. (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I
Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816)).
3 See Dyan Finguerra, The Tenth Amendment Shoots Down The Brady Act, 3
J.L. & POLY 637, 644 (1995).
4 Article 1, section 8, of the Untied States Constitution provides in pertinent
part:
The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defense and general Welfare of the Untied States; ...
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes; ...

To make all Laws

which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the Untied States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3, 18.
5 See U.S. CONST. amend X (stating that "[tihe powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people).
6 See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417 (1992) (holding
unconstitutional the challenged provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
202 1B)).
7d.
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between federal and state authority which must be preserved either
through federal powers expressly granted under the Constitution or
the reservation of state powers under the Tenth Amendment.' This
federalist debate is the backdrop of the controverted federal Brady
Act.9
Since its enactment, five federal district courts have
considered the constitutionality of the mandatory background check
provisions of the Brady Act.' 0 Jay Printz and Richard Mack, both
chief law enforcement officers for Montana and Arizona,
respectively, filed separate actions challenging the constitutionality of
the Brady Act's interim provisions." In each case, the district court
held that the provision requiring chief law enforcement officers to
perform background checks was unconstitutional. 12 In turn, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing the interim provisions
'See Ronald A. Giller, FederalGun Control in the United States: Revival Of
The Tenth Amendment, 10 ST. JOHNS J. LEGAL COMMENT. 151, 155 (1994).
9 Brady Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 103 Stat. 2074. The Act is an amendment
to the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA), 18 U.S.C. § 921, et seq. The Act required the
Attorney General to establish a national instant background check system by November
30, 1998, and immediately put in place certain interim provisions until that system
became operative. Id. Under the interim provisions, a firearms dealer who proposes to
transfer a handgun must first: (1) recieve from the transferee a statement (the Brady
Form), § 922 (s)(I)(A)(i)(1), containing the name, address, date of birth of the proposed
transferee along with a sworn statement that the transferee is not among any of the classes
of prohibited purchasers, § 922 (s)(3); (2) verify the identity of the transferee by
examining an identification document, § 922(s)(l)(A)(i)(1I); and (3) provide the "chief
law enforcement officer" of the transferee's residence with notice of the contents (and a
copy) of the Brady Form, § 922(s)(l)(A)(i)(lII) and (IV). Id. With some exceptions, the
dealer must then wait five days before consummating the sale, unless the chief law
enforcement officer earlier notifies the dealer that he has no reason to believe the transfer
would be illegal. Id.
"0See Finguerra, supra note 3, at 653. All five suits were brought by local
sheriffs whose primary duties were providing court security, transporting state prisoners
and mental health patients, serving process and writs, investigating crime, patrolling the
jurisdiction and supervising the detention center and inmates. Id. All five sheriffs found
difficulty fulfilling the obligations of the Brady Act. Id. The time that most of the
sheriffs spent performing each background check ranged from fifteen minutes to several
days. Id. In addition, the sheriffs budgets did not cover the costs of the checks and
many were forced to use money budgeted for other programs. Id Faced with these
problems they challenged the Brady Act in court. Finguerra, supra note 2, at 653.
" Jay Printz brought an action to challenge the constitutionality of portions
of the Brady Act in Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (1994). Likewise, Richard
Mack also brought an action to challenge the constitutionality of portions of the Brady
Act in Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (1994).
2 See Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1372; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1503. Crossappeals were taken and the cases were consolidated. See Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d
1025 (9th Cir. 1995).
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of the Brady Act as constitutional. 3 The Supreme Court later granted
certiorari. 14
In Printz v. United States, 5 the "petitioners object[ed] to
being pressed into federal service[,] asserting that Congressional
action compelling state officers to execute federal laws is
unconstitutional.
[The] [p]etitioners [further] contend[ed] that
compelled enlistment of state executive officers for the administration
'6
of federal programs is, until very recent years . . ., unprecedented."'
To the contrary, the Government argues that "the earliest Congresses

enacted statutes that required the participation of state officials in the
implementation of federal laws."' 7
Marking only the third time that the Supreme Court has

overturned a major Federal statute, a bitterly divided court ruled on
June 27, 1997 that the Brady gun control law violated the principle of
separate state sovereignty by requiring state officials to conduct
background checks of prospective handgun purchasers.' In
overturning the Brady gun control law with a vision of preserving
state sovereignty, the Supreme Court relied on an interpretation of the
Constitution that does nothing other than trump the assumed primacy
of the Federal Government.

9

The strong disparity between Justice

Scalia's majority opinion and the principal dissenting opinion by
Justice Stevens is evidence of the ongoing debate regarding the proper
limit to be placed on the roles of federal and state governance.20
"3See Mack, 66 F.3d at 1025. The court concluded that "[t]he Brady Act
violates neither the Tenth nor Thirteenth Amendment." The court further concluded "that
there is likely to be some point at which a federal statute that enlists the aid of state
employees can become so burdensome to the State that it violates the Tenth Amendment.
Surely the federal government cannot stall the state government in its tracks by imposing
all-consuming federal duties on State's employees." Id. at 1032. The court finally held
that "the Brady Act does not approach that point." Id.
14 See generally Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
'5 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
16Id. at 2369.
'7 1d.
"SSee id at 2384. "We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the
States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress
cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the States' officers directly. The
Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular
problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program." Id.
"9See Linda Greenhouse, Benchmarks of Justice, N.Y. TMEs, July 1, 1997,
at Al.
20See id.
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Alluding both to Congressional power under the Commerce
Clause as well as to state authority under the Tenth Amendment, the
Court's decision was based largely on the notion that the federal
government may not compel states to implement, by legislation or
executive action, federal regulatory programs.2 While there is "no
constitutional text speaking to the precise question whether
congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal laws
is unconstitutional," the decision in Printz was "sought in historical
understanding and practice, in the Constitution's structure, and in
[the] Court's jurisprudence. 22
The Court began with an examination of legislation enacted
early in the history of Congress, the focal point being an interpretation
of The Federalist Papers, to determine whether the Federal
Government may command the States' executive branch in the
absence of a particularized constitutional authorization.23 Underlying
this was a debate of the Constitution's structure, which sets forth a
system of dual sovereignty,24 and whether implementation of the
Brady Act would disrupt this notion.2 ' The Court next debated the
separation and equilibrium of powers between the three branches of
the Federal Government and whether federal control of state officers
would disrupt this balance. 26 This was followed by a discussion of the
constitutionality of the Brady Act under the Tenth Amendment and
the Commerce Clause.27 The jurisprudence that was developed by the
Court makes it clear that the Federal Government may not compel the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.2"
This Comment will examine and analyze the Supreme Court's
holding in Printz v. United States29 that the Brady Act's interim
provision commanding chief law enforcement officers to conduct
background checks is unconstitutional. Furthermore, this Comment
2 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384 (holding that "such commands are
fundamentally incompatible with out constitutional system of dual sovereignty").
22See id. at 2366.
23

Id.
at 2367.

LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990) (defining sovereignty as
the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is
governed).
2 See Printz, 177 S. Ct. at 2367.
26 See id.
24 BLACK'S

" See id.
28 Id.

29 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
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will analyze the dissent's response as well as the effects that the
Court's decision will have on future gun control laws and society.
Part I provides a detailed examination of the use and interpretation of
The Federalist Papers by both sides of the Court. Specifically,
whether any of the Federalists' statements necessarily imply that
Congress could impose such responsibilities on the states as the Brady
Act requires without the consent of the states. Part II analyzes the
system of dual sovereignty set forth by the Constitution, which is
examined by both sides of the Court, to decide whether
implementation of the Brady Act will agitate this inviolable
sovereignty. Part III follows with an examination by both sides of the
effect that the Brady Act will have on the separation of powers
amongst the three branches of the Federal Government. Part IV
discusses each side's interpretation of the constitutionality of the
Brady Act under the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, as
well as the extent of Congress' powers under each. Finally, Part V
looks at the effects that the implementation of the Brady Act has had
on gun control thus far and considers how the Supreme Court's
decision will effect gun control in the future.
I. THE FEDERALIST
In Printz, the government relied on portions of the Federalist
Papers, particularly Numbers 44 and 27, to establish that the federal
government can impose federal responsibilities
on state
governments."
In response, the Supreme Court states that
"enactments of the early Congresses seem to contain no evidence of
an assumption that the Federal Government may command the States'
executive power in the absence of a particularized constitutional
authorization."3
The crux of the matter is whether the Federalist
Papers suggest or imply that Congress can impose such
responsibilities on the states without the consent of the states.32
The government sets forth observations from Federalist No.
30See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2373-75.
31 id.

See id. at 2366 (stating that the Government misplaces its reliance on
portions of The Federalist, suggesting that federal responsibilities could be imposed on
state officers).
32
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27 stating that the Constitution would "enable the [national]
government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each [state] in the
execution of its laws,"33 and that it was "extremely probable that in
other instances, particularly in the organization of the judicial power,
the officers of the states will be clothed in the correspondent authority
of the Union."34 The Court's response was that "none of these
statements necessarily implies-what is the critical point here-that
Congress could impose these responsibilities without the consent of
the states."35
As Justice Souter points out in his dissent, "the most
straightforward reading of No. 27 is authority for the Government's
position here, and that this reading is both supported by No. 44 and
consistent with Nos. 36 and 45. "36 The majority, however, relies on
FERC v. Mississippi.37 There, Justice O'Connor, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, sets forth her analysis of the Framers' intent
which does not detract from the proper role of federal power in a
federalist system, but merely requires the exercise of that power in a
manner that does not destroy state independence. 3' This very notion
33Id.

Hamilton).

at 2372 citing THE

FEDERALIST

No. 27, at 176 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A.

34 Id. citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45 at 292 (J. Madison).
35Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2372. "They appear to rest on the

natural assumption
that the States would consent to allowing their officials to assist the Federal Government,
an assumption proved correct by the extensive mutual assistance the States and Federal
Government voluntarily provided one another in the early days of the Republic." Id In
Federalist No. 44, Hamilton justifies the requirement that state officials take an oath to
support the Federal Constitution on the ground that they "will have an essential agency in
giving effect to the Federal Constitution."
36 Id. at 2402.
" 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (holding that Titles I and III and section 210 of Title
II of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act did not violate the Commerce Clause or
the Tenth Amendment).
" Id. at 789-790. Justice O'Connor goes on to say
[Flederalism enhances the opportunity of all citizens to
participate in representative government. Alexis de Tocqueville
understood well that participation in local government is a
cornerstone of American democracy: 'It is incontestably true that
the love and the habits of republican government in the United
States were engendered in the townships and in the provincial
assemblies. [I]t is this same republican spirit, it is these manners
and customs of a free people, which are engendered and nurtured
in the different States, to be afterwards applied to the country at
large.' Citizens, however, cannot learn the lessons of selfgovernment if their local efforts are devoted to reviewing
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is discussed by Hamilton in Federalist No. 27 where he addresses the
combined effect of the proposed Supremacy Clause,3 9 and the state
officer's oath requirement. 4' Hamilton states that "the Legislatures,
Courts and Magistrates of the respective members will be
incorporated into the operations of the national government, as far as
its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered
auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.'
Justice Souter interprets
Hamilton's words to mean that the aid of state officials will stem from
their compulsion to support federal law, not from their own, or the
States', choices.42
The Court, however, interprets Hamilton's
description of the state officer's role in carrying out federal law as a
basic duty not to disrupt the operation of federal law.43
What the majority fails to consider is that the implementation
of the Brady Act is not Congressional control of State Legislative
power.44 Rather, the government is implementing a federal program
in which states are free to regulate in order to continue to remedy a

national epidemic.45 While Congress has the ability to pass laws
directly affecting individuals in order to maintain a balance in state
governance, Congress is denied military or legislative power over

proposals formulated by a faraway national legislature. If we
want to preserve the ability of citizens to learn democratic
processes through participation in local government, citizens
must retain the power to govern, not merely administer their
local problems.
Id.

39 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding").
40 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (stating that "[t]he Senators and
Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and
all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States,
shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States").
41Id. at 2373 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.27 at 174-175 (A. Hamilton)).
42 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting).
43
Id.
44 Id. at 2398 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 2405 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

632

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XV

state governments.46 The Federal Government is vested with the
power to enforce federal laws over conflicting state legislation,
thereby leaving the states the ability to govern themselves on a state
level.47 It must not be overlooked that in the national effort to
strengthen gun control laws, legislation has been passed both on a
state and on a national level.4" States are in no way deprived of their
legislative powers with regards to gun control, nor are states deprived
of legislative powers upon implementation of the Brady Act.49 What
Brady legislation entails is not a tampering with state legislation, but
simply a requirement that all handgun purchasers submit to a
background check to be performed by local law enforcement
authorities, and a five day waiting period." Although the Brady Act
results from the implementation of legislation on a federal level,
states are still able to regulate that legislation on a state level. 5
In Federalist No. 44, Madison states that national officials
"will have no agency in carrying the State Constitutions into effect.
The members and officers of the State Governments, on the contrary,
will have an essential agency in giving effect to the Federal
Constitution."52 The Court in Printz found no support in the text of
No. 44 for the notion that state officers have a responsibility to
46 See FERC, 456 U.S. at 795 (stating that "[t]he Framers.... [chose] to
allow Congress to pass laws directly affecting individuals, and reject[ed] proposals that
would have given Congress military or legislative power over state governments.").
41See id."The states retained the power to govern as sovereigns in fields
that Congress cannot or will not preempt." Id.
4' Finguerra, supra note 3, at 638 (discussing the increase in efforts to
regulate purchases on a federal level as a result of minimal state control over the transfer
of firearms). "Although several states passed more restrictive legislation than the federal
government, state control over the transfer of firearms remained minimal. Consequently,
proponents of gun control intensified their efforts to draft federal legislation that would
require all handgun purchasers to submit to a background check and waiting period.
Sarah Brady and Handgun Control, Inc., lobbied on behalf of the "Brady Bill," but their
efforts were stymied for seven years due largely to fierce resistance from the National
Rifle Association of America." Id. at 638-39.
49 See id.
"0See Brady Act, supra note 9 (defining a "waiting period" as the time
between when a purchaser commits to buying a gun and the time when he or she may
actually leave the store in possession of the gun. Within that time period, law
enforcement official performs a background check of the purchaser).
"' See Finguerra, supra note 3, at 647-48. The Court in New York noted that
Congress may "encourage a state to regulate in a particular way, or [provide] incentives
to the states as a method of influencing a state's policy choices ....Cases have identified
a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to
adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests."
52THE FEDERALIST No.44, at 307 (J.
Madison).
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execute federal laws.53 However, when Madison was "asked why
state officers should have to take an oath to support the National
Constitution, he said that 'several reasons might be assigned,' but that
he would 'content [himself] with one which is obvious and
conclusive."'5 4 He describes how state officials will have "an
essential agency in giving effect to the Federal Constitution" by
selecting the executive and legislative members who would exercise
its powers, one of many examples of state officer agency. 5 Justice
Souter interprets such statements to mean that the "authority of the
National Government, when exercising an otherwise legitimate power
[may] require state 'auxiliaries' to take appropriate action. 56 In
No. 36, Hamilton explains that the National Government would
"employ the State officers as much as possible and to attach them to
the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments . . . ,5' The
majority interprets this passage as inducing state officers to come
aboard by paying them, rather than merely commandeering their
" See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2374.
If it was indeed Hamilton's view that the Federal Government
could direct the officers of the States, that view has no clear
support in Madison's writings, or as far as we are aware, in text,
history, or early commentary elsewhere. Even if we agreed with
Justice Souter's reading of Federalist No. 27, it would still seem
to us most peculiar to give the view expressed in that one piece,
not clearly confirmed by any other writer, the determinative
weight he does. That would be crediting the most expansive
view of federal authority ever expressed, and from the pen of the
most expansive expositor of federal power. Hamilton was 'from
first to last the most nationalistic of all nationalists in his
interpretation of the clauses of our federal Constitution.' More
specifically, it is widely recognized that '[tjhe Federalist reads
with a split personality' on matters of federalism. While overall
The Federalist reflects a 'large area of agreement between
Hamilton and Madison,' that is not the case with respect to the
subject at hand. To choose Hamilton's view, as Justice Souter
would, is to turn a blind eye to the fact that it was Madison'snot Hamilton's-that prevailed not only at the Constitutional
Convention and in popular sentiment, but in the subsequent
struggle to fix the meaning of the Constitution by early
Congressional practice.
Id. at 2375, n.9 (citations omitted).
54THE FEDERALIST No. 44 at 307 (J. Madison).
51See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2403.
6
Id.at 2403.
5THE FEDERALIST No.36 at 228 (A. Hamilton).
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official services.5
It is insufficient to the Court to rely only on the views of The

Federalist; especially those not clearly confirmed by any other
writer. 9 To give such determinative weight to uncertain views in a
longing to unravel the meaning of the Constitution is simply not
persuasive enough for the majority. 6' Based on its analysis of these
readings, however, the Court finds it far from persuasive that the

Framers intended for the utilization of state officers to be an
authorization to compel the service of state officers.6'
II. DUAL SOVEREIGNTY

The Brady Act places explicit requirements on the state
officers designated to assist in background checks. 62 The Act places

responsibility on a "chief law enforcement officer" who must
determine whether selling a gun to a prospective purchaser violates
the law. 63 The Act further requires chief law enforcement officers to
destroy requests from those eligible to receive guns after determining
that there is no violation of law 64 and to provide reasons for denial to

ineligible individuals within twenty days after receipt of a request
" See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2374. "Justice Souter deduces from this passage
No. 36 that although the Federal Government may commandeer state officers, it must
compensate them for their services. This is a mighty leap, which would create a
constitutional jurisprudence ....

."

Id.

59 See id. at 2375.
60 See id.
61See id.

Although the government relies on various federal statutes that
require the participation of state or local officials in
implementing federal regulatory schemes, the Court finds them
to be of little relevance. Some of these are connected to federal
funding measures, and can perhaps be more accurately described
as conditions upon the grant of federal funding than as mandates
to the States; others, which require only the provision of
information to the Federal Government, do not involve the
precise issue before [the Court] here, which is the forced
participation of the States' executive in the actual administration
of a federal program.
Id. at 2376.

62See Brady Act, supra note 9
63See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1) (1994).
64 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(B)(i).
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from the individual denied a permit. 65 Although these requirements
amount to no more than a slight burden on any chief law enforcement

officer, the Brady Act has been challenged as to the constitutionality
of the requirements it places on those officers.66 Arguably, the most
controversial portion of the Act is the provision penalizing non
complying officers.6 7

Specifically, the provision provides that

violators may be fined up to $1,000 or imprisoned for up to one
year.68

At issue in Printz is the preservation of America's system of
dual sovereignty: an inviolable sovereignty retained by the states

which is to remain unencroached by the many powers of the federal
government.69 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has described the
question of "the proper division of authority between the Federal
Government and the States" as "perhaps our oldest question of
constitutional law."7 °

As Madison expressed it: "[t]he local or

municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the
supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the
general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere.'

Although our system of dual sovereignty is designed to prevent the
notion of an all-encompassing central government, the
implementation of a federal program solely through federal channels
may bring about just that result. 72 As pointed out by the dissent,
"[t]he majority's rule seems more likely to damage than to preserve
the safeguards against tyranny provided by the existence of vital state
governments. 7 3 State governance and the power allotted to each
state was created to maintain an equilibrium, not a microcosm of
65See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(C).
66See
67

generally Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2396.

See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(5).

68 See id. The Act states in relevant part "[w]hoever knowingly violates
subsection (s) or (t) of section 922 [the Act's background check requirements] shall be
fined not more than $1,000, imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both." Id.
69 See generally Phillip H. Howard, A Constitutional Crossfire: State
Sovereignty and the Brady Law, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 151 (1995).
70 Debrah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. I (1988).
7'THE FEDERALIST No. 39 at 245 (J. Madison).
72See Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2396. The dissent points out that "[t]his is exactly
the sort of thing that the early Federalists promised would not occur, in part as a result of
the National Government's ability to rely on the magistracy of the states." Id.
" Id. "In the name of States' rights, the majority would have the Federal
Government create vast national bureaucracies to implement its policies." Id.
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powers immune to federal regulation.74 What is essential to the
sentiment of state sovereignty is balance.75
By imposing the minimal requirements that the Brady Act sets
forth, states would simply be carrying out federal legislation, as
opposed to aggregating their powers to legislation on a state level
under the direction of the federal government.76 As O'Connor stated
in FERC, "this product of the Constitutional Convention . . . is
fundamentally inconsistent with a system in which either Congress or
a state legislature harnesses the legislative powers of the other
sovereign."77 To the extent that the implementation of a federal
program on a state level may disrupt state sovereignty, exclusion of
state involvement may just as well lead to a concentration of power at
the federal level. 7" As the dissent stated, "[b]y limiting the ability of
the Federal Government to enlist state officials in the implementation
of its programs, the Court creates incentives for the National
Government to aggrandize itself."7 9 The Federalists did not intend
such a concentration of power."0
Ours is a system whereby the powers of the states are
designed to complement the powers of the Federal Government rather
than repel one another.8 ' Interestingly, the Court points out that the
" See id. at 2378. "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive
power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyrrany and abuse from either front." Id (citing
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
15 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378.
76 See id. at 2380-81 (discussing the Government's distinction between
making law and merely enforcing it and between policymaking and mere
implementation).
7
FERC, 456 U.S. at 796, n.35.
After the Convention, several thinkers suggested that the
National Government might rely upon state officers to perform
some of its tasks. Madison, for example, thought that Congress
might rely upon state officials to collect national revenue. None
of these suggestions, however, went so far as to propose
congressional control of state legislative power.
The
suggestions, moreover, seemed to assume that the States would
consent to national use of their officials.
Id.

7 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2396.
79
80

Id. at 2396.

THE FEDERALIST No.36, at 234-235 (A. Hamilton).
"' See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378. Quoting Madison:
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National Government seeks the authority "to impress into its service
.. .the police officers of the 50 States."82 As the dissent replies,
however, "it is difficult to see how state sovereignty and individual
liberty are more seriously threatened by federal reliance on state

police officers to fulfill this minimal request than by the
aggrandizement of a national police force." 3
It seems more
appealing to have state regulation of a federal program than to bear

the imposition of a federal program implemented by a growing
federal bureaucracy, whereby state regulation would be bypassed.
An implied lack of discretion in the powers of chief law
enforcement officers, however, has been interpreted from the use of
the word "shall" as opposed to "may" in the Brady Act itself.8 4 The
use of the word "shall" effects an obligation on chief law enforcement
officers to complete background checks.8 5 It creates a situation

leaving chief law enforcement's officers no other option than to
comply with the regulations set forth by the Brady Act. 6
Furthermore, the House Judiciary Committee Report makes numerous
references to the obligation posed by mandatory background checks.87
For instance, the "Summary and Purpose" section of the committee

report states that chief law enforcement officers are "required to use
"In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered
by the people is first divided between two distinct governments,
and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct
and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will control
each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
THE FEDERALIST No.51, at 323; see also FERC, 456 U.S. at 796, n.33.

"Experience under the Articles of Confederation taught the Framers that
multiple state legislatures, unchecked by any central power, 'threat[en]
danger not to the harmony only, but to the tranquility of the Union."'
82 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378.
83Id. at 2396.
" Michael J. Delaney, Lethal Weapon: Will Tenth Amendment Challenges
Kill The Brady Act?", 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1235-36 (1995). Under § 922(s)(2) of the
Brady Act, the chief law enforcement officer shall make a reasonable effort to determine
whether the handgun purchase would violate the law.
85See id. at 1236 (defining "shall" to mean "indicate... command").
86 See id. 1235-36 (stating that "Congress's use of the word 'shall' confirms
the interpretation that the [chief law enforecfement officer] is expected to complete
background checks, and it clearly does not indicate that [chief law enforcement officers]
have been granted any discretionary power in their efforts to comply.").
87 See id. "In three separate sections of the report, the committee explicitly
referred to the 'required' nature of the background checks."
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the waiting period to determine whether a prospective handgun

purchaser has a
from buying a
Analysis" states
notice pursuant

felony conviction or is otherwise prohibited by law
handgun. 8 8 In addition, the "Section-by-Section
that a chief law enforcement officer "who receives
to this bill of a proposed handgun transfer [must]

make a reasonable effort to ascertain within five business days, using
available criminal history records, whether there is any legal
impediment to the transfer., 89 It seems obvious that without strict

adherence to the requirements set forth by the Brady Act, the purpose
of the legislation becomes defeated.9 °
According to the Court, neither the Constitution nor the
Federalist Papers states or implies that Congress could impose such
responsibilities without the consent of the States. 9 ' Consent, the
common thread, is the key word nowhere to be found in textual
writings.92 Without grounds on which to base such consent, the
government is building a structure void of any foundation to support
it. 93 In this sense, Congress' efforts to implement a federal program
on a state level become nothing more than an assumption coupled
with an implementation of undelegated powers. 94 The Constitution is
silent on this question, thereby raising no bar to action by the States or
by the people. 95
In U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, the Court held that the states

have "no powers respecting the federal government unless the
Constitution expressly delegates them." 96 In his dissent, Justice
1984.

18 H.R. 344, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 7, reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.A.A.N. at

Delaney, supra note 84, at 1236.
See id. at 1235-36.
9'See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2372.
92See id.
9 See id.
94 See id.
9' See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845 (1995) (stating that
"[niothing in the Constitution deprives the people of each State of the power to prescribe
eligibility requirements for the candidates who seek to represent them in Congress.").
96 Id. at 801
(discussing the Government's use of the Federalist's
observations to establish that the Constitution would "enable the [national] government
to employ the ordinary magistracy of each [State] in the execution of its laws," and that is
was "extremely probable that in other instances, particularly in the organization of the
judicial power, the officers of the States will be clothed in the correspondent authority of
the Union" but that this language does not imply that states can be utilized without their
consent).
89See
90
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Thomas delivered a detailed analysis of the notion of powers reserved
to the States under the Tenth Amendment. 97 When the Federal
Constitution was adopted, the people of each state surrendered some
of their authority to the United States.9" State powers were allotted to

the Federal Government, in turn, tipping the balance of federalist
preservation.99 As stated by Justice Black, "[t]he United States is
entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have
no other source."' 10 0 In each State, the remainder of the people's
powers - "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are either delegated to
the state government or retained by the people."'' In turn, it is left up

to each individual state's constitution to declare which powers the
0 2
people of each State have delegated to their state government.
States are free to exercise any powers not specifically withheld from
them by the Federal Constitution.

3

When the Constitution is silent

about the exercise of a particular power, the federal government lacks
°
0
that power and the states enjoy it.'
Therefore, under Thomas'
theory, the Brady Act would certainly be deemed unconstitutional as

a violation of the Tenth Amendment.0 5 The Constitution is silent on
the issue of handgun control, and the duties imposed by the Act on
847-48 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 847 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas added that "[t]he
people of each State obviously did trust their fate to the people of the several states when
they consented to the Constitution; not only did they empower the governmental
institutions of the United States, but they also agreed to be bound by constitutional
amendments that they themselves refused to ratify." Id. at 849.
9 See US. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 847. "Because the people of the several
states are the only true source of power, . . . the Federal Government enjoys no authority
beyond what the Constitution confers: the Federal Government's powers are limited and
enumerated."
"o Id. at 847 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6, (1957) (plurality
opinion)).
'0' U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 847.
'02See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
103 John R. Vile, Truism, Tautology or Vital Principle? The Tenth
Amendment Since United States v. Darby, 27 CuM. L. REv. 445, 449 (1996-1997). In
formulating the Tenth Amendment, James Madison "thought the amendment necessary
only to quiet popular anxieties about undue aggrandizement of national powers at the
expense of the
1 4 states or the rights of the people." Id.
o See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
105Vince Lee Farhat, Term Limits and the Tenth Amendment: the Popular
Sovereignty Model of Reserved Powers, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1163 (1996) (noting that
"Thomas' approach is new because it involves a unique question in modem Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence").
97 See id. at
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state officials are not authorized by any enumerated power. Thus, the
power to impose background checks and waiting periods would be
reserved to the people of the states.
Powers not expressly set forth by the Constitution is an area of
the law that leaves a gap to be filled by implications, assumptions and
precedence. This debate over the limits of Congressional authority
over state powers can go on everlastingly. In this instance, an
obvious obstacle is the national priority to find a solution to the
violence and deaths that are caused by guns every hour of every
day. 10 6 Enacted in 1993 to help combat an epidemic of gun violence
in our nation, the purpose of the Brady Act is to deny handguns to
those legally ineligible to own them. °7 Such minimal burdens set
forth by the government, which have been proven to provide
tremendous results, are highly unlikely to impede or minimize state
sovereignty.'
Implementation of the Brady Act in no way restricts
the states to delegate its powers in whatever way they deem necessary
on a legislative level.'0 9 Although the Court set forth strong
arguments based on history, precedence and the structure of the
Constitution," 0 such arguments only remain valid in bits and pieces.
In other words, upon interpreting each argument exclusively, each
particular argument will surely make legal sense and stand strong
ground. Such arguments, taken individually, will certainly override
the reasons that Congress set forth for the constitutionality of the
Brady Act. When, however, the Court's arguments are placed in the
scope of a national gun epidemic in which lives are lost every day and
then compared to the minuteness of the burden which is placed upon
state officials and state powers, these arguments begin to lose their

'0' Sarah Brady, Working for a Safer America, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 77, 78 (1994) (discussing the epidemic of gun violence as a national concern).

.0.
Andrejs Racenis, Brady Act Makes Streets Safer, CHI. SuN-TIMEs, Dec.
11, 1996, at 42. Such persons include convicted felons, fugitives from justice, persons
under indictment, persons adjudicated mentally defective or committed to mental
institutions, illegal drug users, persons who have renounced their U.S. citizenship,
persons dishonorably discharged from the military, persons subject to restraining order
for alleged domestic violence, illegal aliens and, generally, persons under 18 years of age.
Id.
'o' See Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2396.
109See id.
"0See id. at 2367.
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strength."' What the Court fails to do is to apply the law in light of
the seriousness of gun control. We must not lose light of the fact that
James Brady is a man who was shot and gravely wounded in the
attempted assassination of President Reagan. What we must be
concerned with is whether or not today's judges are in touch with the
human side of the law.
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS

Justice Holmes said, "the machinery of government would not
work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints.""' 2 "The Framers
explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power
to regulate individuals, not States.""' 3 Justice Kennedy points out that
the great innovation of this design was that
[O]ur citizens would have two political capacities, one
state and one federal, each protected from incursion
by the other-a legal system unprecedented in form
and design, establishing two orders of government,
each with its own direct relationship, its own privity,
its own set of mutual rights and obligations4 to the
people who sustain it and are governed by it.)
Our National Government is a product of the very people who

created it." 5 Accordingly, our Constitution preserves power in the
states whereby "each individual citizen everywhere enjoy[s] the same
...See Brady, supra note 106, at 78 (stating that "[a]s horrifying as the
statistics are, it is even more horrifying to realize that we have not yet truly made it a
national priority to change them).
12 Bain Peanut Co. of Texas v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931).
" New York, 505 U.S. at 166. The Court added that "[a]s we have seen, the
Court has consistently respected this choice. Id. We have always understood that even
where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or
prohibit those acts. Id. The allocation of power contained in the Commerce Clause, for
example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not
authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce." Id.
14 US. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 838.
15 Id. at 839 (characterizing the National Government as "republican in
essence and in theory"). "As James Madison explained, the House of Representatives
'derive[s] its powers from the people of America,' and 'the operation of the government
on the people in their individual capacities' makes it 'a national government,' not merely
a federal one." Id.

642

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

national rights, privileges, and protection ....

[Vol. XV
,16

Sovereign

immunity protects the states from the effects of those powers
explicitly conferred to Congress in the Constitution.117 It exempts
states from any laws that would violate their intended sovereignty."'
In essence, our Constitution marks the barrier between those powers
allocated to the states and those allocated to the federal government.

There is a concern expressed by the Court, however, that the
Brady Act will essentially disrupt the separation and balance of
powers conferred among the three branches of the Federal
Government." 9 To quote Madison:
[I]n the compound republic of America, the power
surrendered by the people is first divided between two
distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to
each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the
rights of the people. The different governments will
control each other, at the same time that each will be
controlled by itself.20
The Court points out that the Constitution does not leave to
speculation who is to administer the laws enacted by Congress.' 2 '
The President, it says, "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed ....
""' By instituting a five-day waiting period and
mandatory background check by chief law enforcement officers, the
Court interprets the Brady Act to transfer the Presidential
6

THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, 38-29.
Philip H. Howard, A ConstitutionalCrossfire: State Sovereignty and the
Brady Law, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 151 (1995) (examining the distinction between
state autonomy and state immunity).
I

118Id.

"9 Printz, 177 S. Ct. at 2378 (stating that "[j]ust as the separation and
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from
either front")
120

THE FEDERALIST No.

51 at 323 (J. Madison).

Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378. "[Tlhe President, it says, 'shall take Care that
Laws be faithfully executed,' Art II, § 3, personally and through officers whom he
appoints (save for such inferior officers as Congress may authorize to be appointed by the
'Courts of Law' or by the 'Heads of Departments' who are themselves presidential
appointees) Art. II, § 2." Id.
' U.S. CONST. art. II, §3.
1
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responsibility to thousands of chief law enforcement officers within
the fifty states, "who are left to implement the program without
meaningful Presidential control, if indeed meaningful Presidential
control is possible without the power to appoint and remove."' 23 The
Court goes on to say that the unity within the Federal Executive-to
insure both vigor and accountability insisted upon by the Framers' 24-

"would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject
to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively without the President
as with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute its laws."' 25
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, contends that the Court's
reasoning contradicts New York v. United States.'26 He confidently

points out that the decision in New York "approved of cooperative
federalism programs, designed at the national level but implemented
principally by state governments."' 27 The Court in New York found
no flaw in the existence of federal programs implemented locally, it
was the method of putting such programs into place that the Court
found problematic.'28 As stated by the majority in New York,
[T]his is not to say that Congress lacks the ability to
encourage a State to regulate in a particular way, or
that Congress may not hold out incentives to the states

as a method of influencing a State's policy choices.
Our cases have identified a variety of methods, short
..
3Printz, 117 S.Ct. at 2378.
""Id. The Court notes that "[tihere is not, as the dissent believes, tension
between the proposition that impressing state police officers into federal service will
massively augment federal power, and the proposition that it will also sap the power of
the Federal Presidency. Id. It is quite possible to have a more powerful Federal
Government that is, by reason of the destruction of its Executive unity, a less efficient
one. Id. The dissent is correct that control by the unitary Federal executive is also
sacrificed when states voluntarily administer federal programs, but the condition of
voluntary state participation significantly reduces the ability of Congress to use this
device as a means
of reducing the power of the Presidency." Id.
12
5 Id.
126Printz,

117 S.Ct. at 2396. Justice Stevens also suggests that "with respect
to programs that directly enlist the local government officials, the majority's position rests
on nothing more than a fanciful hypothetical". Id.
127Id. at 2396. Faced with a looming shortage of disposal sites for low level
radioactive waste in 31 States, Congress enacted the Low-Level radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985, which, among other things, imposes upon States, either alone
or in "regional compacts" with other states, the obligation to provide for the disposal of
waste generated within their borders, and contains three provisions setting forth
"incentives" to states to comply with that obligation. Id.
12ld.
(citing New York, 505 U.S. at 166).
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of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a
State to adopt a legislative program consistent with
federal interests.'2 9
Clearly, the difference between the "take title" provisions in
New York and the federal program at issue in Printz is significant
since the implementation of the Brady Act does not require policymaking, but rather, it issues a directive to state chief law enforcement
officers. 3 ° Nowhere does the Court disagree with the idea that
making law rather than merely enforcing law, or policy making rather
than mere implementation, enters the realm of an unconstitutional
delegation of authority thereby leaving mere enforcement of the law
and mere implementation of policy constitutionally viable. 3 ' The
Court responds by saying that "[e]xecutive action that has utterly no
policy making component is rare, particularly at an executive level 3as2
high as a jurisdiction's chief-law enforcement officer."'
Accordingly, the Brady Act must be a rarity.
As far as policy is concerned, the Brady Act is nothing more
than a principal plan, or course of action, set forth by the government
133
to be followed by the chief law enforcement officers of the states.
Any and all policy making has already been done at the federal level,
therefore, it does not fall into the hands of the chief law enforcement
officers. 134 According to the language of the background check
provision, duties of chief law enforcement officers include "research
in whatever State and local record keeping systems are available and
a national system designated by the Attorney General.' 1
It is implied by the language of this provision "that the
29

New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
Brady Act, supra note 9.
131 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380 (discussing the Government's distinction
between making law and merely enforcing it and between policymaking and mere
implementation).
132Id. at 2381. The court notes that "[i]t may well satisfy the Act for a chief
law enforcement officer to direct that (a) no background checks will be conducted that
divert personnel time from pending felony investigations, and (b) no background check
will be permitted to consume more than one-half hour of an officer's time. Id. But
nothing in the Act requires a chief law enforcement officer to be so parsimonious;
diverting at least some felony-investigation time, and permitting at least some
background checks beyond one-half hour would certainly not be unreasonable." Id.
131See id. at 2380.
134
1

13oSee

id.

13SSee

Delaney, supra note 84, at 1237.
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reasonable effort of the background check will require a minimum
amount of research into whatever record keeping system is available
to the chief law enforcement officer."' 3 6 Such duties hardly denote

policy making since the policy is already set forth in the research
systems provided to the officers on which they are to base their
decisions.'37 Clearly, what is expected is an implementation of the
policy set forth.
Two additional duties are imposed onto the chief law
enforcement officers when conducting the mandatory background
checks.38 First, the chief law enforcement officer "must destroy the

paperwork generated during the background search if the applicant is
deemed eligible, 9 and second, if the applicant is determined to be
ineligible to receive a handgun, the chief law enforcement officer
must provide the reason for the denial upon proper request,' ' 40 the
source of which shall be derived from the research systems available
to the officers. Such requirements seem to resemble formalities

related to carrying out policy rather than direct involvement with the
formulation of that policy.
It is claimed by the dissent in Printz that "[t]he enactment of
statutes that merely involve the gathering of information, or the use of

state officials on an interim basis, do not raise even arguable
separation-of-powers concerns."' 4'4 There seems to be no force to the
136Delaney, supra note 84, at 1237. By using the word "including" in its
language, Congress places a "minimum threshold below which the [chief law
enforcement officer] cannot go without violating the purpose of the Brady Act." What is
required of the chief law enforcement officer entails reasonable efforts and a limited
amount of time.
117See Delaney, iupranote 84, at 1237.
"' See Delaney, supra note 84, at 1237.
...
See Delaney, supra note 84, at 1237.
140Delaney, supra note 84, at 1237.

Under both provisions, the [chief law enforcement officer] must
fulfill the required duties, and in the recent controversies, the
government has conceded that both the destruction of records
provision and the explanation of reasons provision are
mandatory, provided a background check is instituted.
Therefore, these provisions, coupled with the mandatory
background check, require the chief law enforcement officer to
perform three separate mandatory tasks.
Id.

14'Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2396, n.22 (pointing out that "[piutting to one side
the obvious tension between the majority's claim that impressing state police officers will
unduly tip the balance of power in favor of the federal sovereign and this suggestion that

646

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XV

Court's assumption that if such a trivial burden as the Brady Act's
requirements on state sovereignty is permissible, the entire structure
of federalism will soon collapse.142 Again, the Brady Act does not
involve the states' enactment of new rules or their involvement in
policy making. 43 When legislative action is at stake, Congress
chooses either to trump the state's powers by administering the laws
itself, or to respect state sovereignty by allowing states to administer
their own laws. 44 However, what is unique about Printz is that
although Congress may be exceeding its powers, the duties imposed
on state officers are modest. 145 Never before in a case where the
Court has held that Congress has exceeded its powers has the
imposition posed by the law in question been so minimal. 46 "Neither
explicitly nor implicitly did the Framers issue any command that
forbids Congress from imposing federal duties on private citizens or
on local officials."'147 Congress has done nothing other than follow
this intention, authorizing federal agencies and federal agents to
4
administer federal programs. 1
The Court in New York seems to accept the fact that Congress
could require private persons, such as hospital executives or school
administrators, to provide arms merchants with relevant information
about a prospective purchaser's fitness to own a weapon. Indeed, the
Court does not disturb the conclusion that flows directly from prior
holdings that the burden on police officers would be permissible if a
similar burden were also imposed on private parties. 49 That general
practice, however, does not negate the existence of power to rely on
state officials in occasional situations in which such reliance is in the
national interest. 5° It seems safe to say that the nationwide
it will emasculate the Presidency, the court's reasoning contradicts New York v. Untied
States.").
141 Id. at 2397. "A structural problem that vanishes when the statute affects
private individuals as well as public officials is not much of a structural problem." Id.
41 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380 (discussing the Government's distinction
between making law and merely enforcing it and between policymaking and mere
implementation).
144See id. at 2397.
145See id.
146 See id
141Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2397.
141 See id.
149See id.
15oSee id.
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implementation of gun control laws is in the national best interest.
IV. COMMERCE CLAUSE POWER
The Tenth Amendment places a limit on Article I of the
Constitution, which grants Congress numerous powers, including the
power to tax and to regulate interstate commerce. 5
The Tenth
Amendment was passed to preserve the division of authority and to
limit Congress to its enumerated powers. 5 2 As the Supreme Court
has been grappling to define the scope of federalism, facially the
Tenth Amendment secured its role by preserving state authority.'
This system of dual sovereignty was
preserved through a balance of
54
power at each level of government.
It is the New York case that created a safe harbor for the
preservation of state sovereignty.'
The Court in New York stated
that although the Tenth Amendment textually provides no limitation
on federal power, it
confirms that the power of the Federal Government is
subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve
power to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus
directs us to determine, as in this case, whether an
incident of state sovereignty is protected by a
limitation on an Article I power. 56

is, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress "Power to lay and collect
Taxes" and "Power to regulate Commerce... among the several States").
1' See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819) (holding that
Congress had the right to establish a national bank, while noting that government was
one of enumerated powers); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-177 (1803)
(emphasizing that the federal government was to be limited to its enumerated powers).
'1 Ronald A. Giller, Federal Gun Control in the United States: Revival of
the Tenth Amendment, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 151, 157 (1994).
154See id. ("Within a federalist structure, state governments were to have
'dual soveriegnty' with the federal government. Accordingly, the power of each level of
government would be balanced against the other, although each would be supreme within
its sphere.").
' New York, 505 U.S. at 149 (addressing the constitutionality of three
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 and
discerning the proper division of authority between the Federal Government and the
States).
156 Id. at 157.
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The Court in New York concluded that Congress was not authorized to

"commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly

compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program,""' irrespective of how legitimate the federal interest may
be. Congress, therefore, could not constitutionally force the states to
regulate or to take title to radioactive waste.' 58 The Court did note
that there are ways in which Congress may encourage states to

regulate federal legislation.' 59
The Court in New York stated that the Tenth Amendment
restrains the power of Congress, but that limit is not derived from the
text of the Tenth Amendment itself.6 Rather, the Tenth Amendment
confirms that the power of the federal government is subject to limits
that may, in any given instance, reserve power to the states.' 6' In its
opinion, the Court also noted that the Constitution does not give
Congress authority to require states to regulate, no matter how
powerful the federal interest involved. Rather, the Constitution gives
Congress the authority to62 regulate matters directly and to preempt
contrary state regulation.
IS? Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
' Id. The Court states that "[wlhile Congress has substantial powers to
govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the
States to govern according to Congress' instructions." Id.at 162.
159Id. at 165. The Court emphasizes that Congress by no means "lacks the
ability to encourage a State to regulate in a particular way, or ...[the ability to] hold out
incentives to the States as a method of influencing a State's policy choices. [Their] cases
have identified a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may
urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests." Id. at 166.
16 See Scott Bohene, Mack v. United States: The Federal Eagle Nestles Into
the Executive Branches of State Government, 30 GA. L. REv. 1117, 1133 (1996) (stating
that "[c]ongress may attach conditions to the receipt of federal funds, or it may threaten
total preemption of the subject area. Either of these methods would allow the state to
retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not it will comply with the federal
directives.").
161See U.S. CONST. amend X.
161See New York, 505 U.S. at 166.

In Hodel v. Virginia, the Court upheld the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 precisely because it did
not 'commander' the State's into regulating mining. The Court
found that the States are not compelled to enforce the steep-slope
standards, to expend any state funds, or to participate in the
federal regulatory program in any manner whatsoever. If a State
does not wish to submit a proposed permanent program that
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In Printz, the dissent relies on Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause coupled with a direct application of the Necessary
and Proper Clause to establish the constitutional validity of the Brady
Act. 163 It reasons, that the power to regulate the sale of handguns
under the Commerce Clause, combined with the power to "make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers,"' 164 conclusively establishes the Brady Act's
constitutional validity, because the Tenth Amendment imposes no
limitations on the exercise of powers "not delegated to the United
States." 165 In response to this contention, the Court applies somewhat
circular reasoning. Justice Scalia notes that "[w]hen a '[l]a[w]... for
carrying into Execution' the Commerce Clause violates the principle
of state sovereignty ... it is not a '[I]a[w] ... proper for carrying into
Execution the Commerce Clause,' and is thus, in the words of The
Federalist, 'merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation' which 'deserve[s] to be
treated as such."", 66 Furthermore, the majority points out that the
dissent's Necessary and Proper Clause argument is answered in the
New York case where it was set forth that "even where Congress has
the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power
directly to compel the
167
States to require or prohibit those acts."'
Upon consideration of the dissent's earlier contention that the
requirements set forth by the Brady Act do not violate state
sovereignty, since the Act issues a final directive to state chief law
enforcement officers rather than a policy making requirement, the
Necessary and Proper Clause argument certainly remains viable. The
Court points out, however, that the dissent "falsely presumes that the
Tenth Amendment is the exclusive textual source of protection for

complies with the Act and implementing regulations, the full
regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal Government.
Id.

163See
164

165

Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2387-88.

Id.

id.

I66
Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (A. Hamilton)).
167 New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
"[Tlhe Commerce Clause, for example,
authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize
Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce
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principles of federalism.' ' 68 Justice Scalia goes on to say that "[o]ur
system of dual sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitutional
provisions, and [it is] not only those, like the Tenth Amendment, that
' 69
speak to the point explicitly."'
Perhaps the fact that the duties imposed on chief law
enforcement officers are minimal in nature should be afforded some
consideration. In Koog v. United States,7° the Brady Act was deemed
constitutional on the grounds that the Tenth Amendment does not
prohibit the federal government from imposing minimal duties on
state officials.'71 The Court in Printz, however, found the duties
imposed by the Brady Act more similar to those imposed by Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) in FERC.'72 At
issue in FERC were Titles I and III and section 210 of PURPA,'73

which Congress enacted to combat the nationwide energy crisis.' 74
Titles I and III of PURPA related to regulatory policies for electricity
and gas utilities.'75 These titles, administered by the Secretary of
Energy, were designed to "encourage the adoption of certain retail
regulatory practices" by directing "state utility regulatory
commissions and nonregulated utilities to 'consider' the adoption and76
implementation of specific 'rate design' and regulatory standards."'1
Although the federal proposals were detailed and extensive, the state
authorities and nonregulated utilities were neither required to adopt
nor implement the federal suggestions.'77 The Court held that Titles I
and III did not violate the Tenth Amendment because they required
only consideration of federal standards-the states were not mandated
to enact the regulations. 7 8 The Court declared that there is nothing in
168 Printz, 117 U.S. at 2379, n.13. "It is not at all unusual for out resolution
of a significant
constitutional question to rest upon reasonable implication." Id.
169 id.
70852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
"' Id. at 1388.
172 id.
'3 16 U.S.C. § 2601.
174FERC, 456 U.S. at 745.
"' Id. at 746
176Id. The Titles share three goals: (1) to encourage "conservation of energy
supplied by ... utilities"; (2) to encourage "the optimization of the efficiency of use of
facilities and resources" by utilities; and (3) to encourage "equitable rates to consumers."
Id. (citations omitted).
'"Id.at 749-50.
m Id. at 765.
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PURPA "directly compelling" the States to enact a legislative
program. 79
In defense of the principles of federalism, the Tenth
Amendment may sometimes be equated with principles that are
relative to its literal language.'
For instance, it can be argued that
"the anti-commandeering principle Justice O'Connor articulated in
New York is consistent with, and perhaps even implicit in, the idea of
federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment and elsewhere in the
Constitution." '' While a narrow reading of the text of the Tenth
Amendment does not forbid this anti-commandeering principle,82
nowhere does the Tenth Amendment require us to recognize it.'
Likewise, the notion that the judiciary should follow a "plain
statement" rule, set forth in Gregory v. Ashcroft,' 83 in which the Court

refused to apply federal regulations to state employees unless such
regulations are clearly intended by Congress, can be considered a
direct product of the federalism that the Tenth Amendment
embodies.'84 That is, of course, if the reader chooses a narrow
reading of the Tenth Amendment.8 5
We must continue to recognize that the position that the states
occupy in our constitutional system is a vital one. We must also
recognize, however, that this position is dependent upon the scope of
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment. 86 Although there are safeguards built into our system
of dual sovereignty to maintain a balance of the allocation of powers
79

FERC, 456 U.S. at 745. There is nothing in PURPA 'directly compelling'
the States to enact a legislative program. In short, because the two challenged Titles
simply condition continued state involvement in a preemptible area on the consideration
of federal proposals, they do not threaten the State's 'separate and independent
existence." Id.
' See Vile, supra note 103, at 522.
1. Id. at 522.
182See id.
183501 U.S. 452 (1991).
184Id.
' See id; see also LANE SUNDERLAND, POPULAR GOVERNMENT AND THE
SUPREME COURT 194 (1996) (citing the Tenth Amendment as "an example of the need to
go beyond clause-bound interpretivism in order to understand the Constitution").
186Id. at 522 (stating that "[tihe principal and basic limit on the federal
commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action--the built-in restraints that
our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action. The
political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be
promulgated").
1
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on both levels of government, in a sense this balance depends on
Congress' exercise of its own powers.' 87 On federalism, Justice
Blackmun noted that "[t]he text of the Constitution provides the
beginning rather than the final answer to every inquiry into questions
of federalism, for [b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions
are postulates which limit and control ....,88
V. EFFECTS OF PRINTZ V. UNITED STATES

On its second anniversary, Attorney General Janet Reno and
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin announced that the Brady Act, in

addition to other crime-fighting measures, "helped reduce national
violent crime rates by four percent in 1994 and another five percent in
the first half of 1995."'"9 In addition, "firearms were used in six
percent fewer assaults in 1994 than in 1993. ' 90 Rubin and Reno
noted that "[e]ach month the Brady Act is preventing nearly 2,500
criminals from buying guns while permitting law-abiding citizens to
do so."''
Attorney General Reno followed by stating that, "Brady
law checks are also helping local police identify and arrest gunbuying criminals, often on other serious charges.' 92 Furthermore, the
117Id.

"The political process ensures that laws the unduly burden the States
will no be promulgated."
' Garcia v. San Antonio Meto. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547 (1985)
(citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)). This idea is further supported
in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), where Marshall observed that "the
wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence
which their constituents possess at elections, declaring war, the sole restraints on which
they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the
people must often rely solely, in all representative governments." Id
189On Second Anniversary, Rubin And Reno Rail Brady Act's Success
Limiting Illegal Handgun Sales And Fighting Crime, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
NEWS RELEASE, Feb. 28, 1996 [hereinafter TREASURY NEWS RELEASE].
'9o
Id. For example, in October 1995, "a Brady check helped ATF agents
apprehend a convicted murderer as he tried to buy three handguns in Dekalb County,
Georgia. Before the Brady Act, he had purchased at least eight other guns without being
challenged." In April of 1995, the Brady Act "helped ATF agents and local police
apprehend a convicted heroin dealer and fugitive trying to buy a gun in Blair County,
Pennsylvania. Prior to Brady, he had purchased at least seven other guns without
challenge and traded them to support his crack cocaine addiction. He is now serving two
years in prison on various charges." In February 1996, "a Brady check helped the
Wichita county Sheriff stop a handgun sale to a man who had battered and threatened to
kill his ex-wife and children." Id.
191
Id.

192
Id.
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Brady law has resulted in the arrests of "murders, drug dealers, wifebeaters and other criminals."' 93
On the third anniversary of the implementation of the Brady
Act, President Clinton made a public statement naming the Brady Act
"one of the most effective public safety measures ever."' 194 He
announced that "during its first 28 months, the Brady Act prevented
more than 186,000 felons, fugitives, and stalkers from buying a
handgun."' 95 He went on to say that "[e]very month the Brady Act
blocks an average of 6,600 illegal over-the-counter gun sales, with
indicted or convicted felons constituting more than seventy percent of
the rejections."' 196 According to a one study, states that require
background checks on prospective gun purchasers are also having a
positive effect on gun control by reducing interstate gun trafficking.' 97
It is clear that the implementation of the Brady Act has had
only positive effects on gun control in our society. 1 8 It has prevented
thousands of criminals from obtaining firearms and by doing so has
saved so many lives. 99 Attorney General Janet Reno pointed out that
"[t]he Brady Act has been a catalyst for improvements in automating
the nation's criminal history records, helping prepare for 21st century
crime fighting. 2 °° It seems that, instead of focusing on the Brady Act
in the context of a strict interpretation of the Constitution and the
193Id.

194Clinton

Statement on the Brady Act Anniversary, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Feb.

28, 1997.
195Id.
196Id.

"97
See John D. McClain, Handguns - Checks Reduce Trafficking, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 20, 1997, at 4A. (stating that "[tihe Center to Prevent Handgun
Violence said.. .that figures from the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
demonstrate that checks and waiting periods required by the so-called Brady law had a
major and positive effect").
"I U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, BRADY BACKGROUND CHECKS To RESUME
NATIONWIDE (TREAS. RR-2157) (Jan. 14, 1998). "According to Department of Justice
surveys, background checks of the kind provided for in the Brady Act have prevented
firearm sales to over 300,000 felons, fugitives, and others prohibited from receiving or
possessing them."
199
See TREASURY NEWS RELEASE, supra note 189. As discussed by Secretary
Robert E. Rubin and Attorney General Janet Reno, background checks are a public safety
measure that saves lives.
200 Id. "[T]he Justice Department has made, [from 1994 to 1996], more than
$130 million available to the states and worked [with] localities to help them automate
their criminal. history records-improvements that will also help track sex offenders,
domestic abusers, and child molesters, and help childcare facilities and nursing homes
screen potential employees."
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history of the Courts, the Supreme Court should have considered why
the Brady Act works.2"' By allowing the modest inconvenience of
such a trivial burden on locil law enforcement officers to trump the
safety and well-being of the individual people of the state the Court
has undermined the reality of the law in relation to the people. A
majority of the justices reacted negatively to the federal mandate.20 2
Justice Scalia, clearly not an advocate for the Brady Act, "likened it
to having state and local government 'simply dancing like marionettes
on the fingers of the federal government.""'2 3 It is difficult, as a
person living in today's society, to comprehend why the Court
chooses to look at the Brady Act through such a narrow lens by
essentially opting to disregard the effects that it is having on saving
lives as well as crime prevention. Instead of clear cut supremacy,
why not view the mandate as a program through which the states
simply aid the government in carrying it through?
Some feel that the Supreme Court ruling will have no effect
on future gun legislation.2 ' When the Brady Act became effective, a
radical handgun control group pushed for "Brady II," which was
designed to "impose the most onerous firearms prohibitions ever
foisted on the American people, and it would have been enforced via
the impressment of the states."205 Through its rigorous policies,
"Brady II would have required the states to mandate the licensing and
the fingerprinting of handgun owners and would have banned all
handgun transfers in any state that did not comply."20 6 Furthermore,
"[s]tate chief law enforcement officers would have been required to
administer the law [and] the states would also have been required to
enact handgun registration.""2 7 To some, the waiting period is noted
20 See Brady Background Check to Resume Nationwide, supra note 197.
Virtually all of the states affected by the Court's ruling have continued to employ
background checks voluntarily. The Brady Act is critical to saving lives and preventing
crime. Id.
202Brady Act May Face Trouble In High Court, DES MOiNES REG., Dec.4,
1996, at 4.
203Id. at 4.
204Stephen P. Halbrook, 'Printz' Will Have Effect on Gun Legislation, NAT.
L. J.,
Aug. 8, 1997, at A18. As one of the counsel who argued Printz v. United States in
the Supreme Court, Stephen Halbrook "take[s] issue with Handgun Control Inc.'s Dennis
Henigan's claim
20 that the ruling will not affect future gun legislation." Id.
5Id.
206 Id.

207 Id. "In addition, the bills would have required state chief law enforcement
officers to investigate people who possessed more than 20 guns or 1,000 rounds of
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as having "no purpose other than to allow for background checks of
gun purchasers ...[a]nd not only will police not 'continue' to do the

checks, [following the Court's invalidation of the Brady Act], they
never did them in the first place."2 8 It has been noted that officers
performing background checks under Brady I were only checking the
National Crime Information Center records; something that Federal
employees were capable of doing all along." 9
In situations where black letter law does not exist to address
the issue at hand, priorities become mishandled. On one hand,
validation of the Brady Act might have opened several floodgates,
such as inflated implementation of Congressional powers and a slow
diminution of state sovereignty to name a few. Although the
Constitution is constantly evolving, we try not to lose scope of the
Framers' original intent. Anything else would simply defeat the
purpose of maintaining this body of law that we use to guide our
system of government. The United States Constitution sets forth our
system of governance and one of the jobs of the Court is to maintain
this institution. It must be argued, however, that despite a strict
application of the Constitution, what is at issue here are human
lives.2"0 How can we ignore the fact that the Brady Act is saving
lives? This discloses one of the most critical problems with the
Constitution that has been recurring for the past 150 years: where to
"'
draw the line when an issue is not addressed directly on point.21
Regulatory programs set forth by the federal government are
intended to function for the benefit of the people. It is the people who
matter most yet who seem to be lost in this puzzle of Constitutional
interpretation. It is the reliance of the people on Congress' judgments
that will be shattered as a result of this ruling. Justice Stevens noted
that the "Court should be relying on Congress to make the political
judgments on what to require of the states" instead of making those
ammunition. Id."Gun collectors and sportsmen would have been required to obtain an
'arsenal license' and waive their Fourth Amendment rights." Id.
208Id.
209Id.
211 See Brady, supra note 106, at 78 (stating that "[i]f the violence which
results from easy access to guns was a disease that was taking the lives of fifteen children
every day, it would be a national priority to find a solution").
211 See Howard, supra note 117, at 173.
For instance, "recent Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has generated confusion and
substantially different interpretations among the lower courts." Id.
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judgments for Congress." 2 It is nothing but a fabrication to assume
that implementation, of the Brady Act will drain the states of its
preservation of state sovereignty. Instead, it should be recognized
that this modest imposition is something that both the state and
federal governments, and most importantly the individual people of
the states, will benefit from.
VI. CONCLUSION

This comment has examined the confusion surrounding the
doctrine of state sovereignty against the lack of textual evidence to
guide the Court in its decision. Some might argue that what matters is
what is happening today, not what was happening two hundred years
ago when the Constitution was written. The law is constantly
evolving and the Constitution is an instrument that was intended to
evolve alongside- society and the law.
Any application of
constitutional law is misguided if the issue is not being applied in
light of its circumstance, unless such application would explicitly
violate the terms of the Constitution. Thus, where an issue is not
specifically addressed in the Constitution it should not be treated
exclusively, rather it should be looked at in light of its surrounding
circumstances. As Justice Breyer points out in his dissent,
there is neither need nor reason to find in the
Constitution an absolute principle-forbidding the
assignment of virtually any federal duty to any state
official, the inflexibility of which poses a surprising
and technical obstacle to the enactment of a law that
Congress believed necessary to solve an important
national problem. Nor is there a need to read the
Brady Act as permitting the Federal Government to
overwhelm a state civil service." 3
The Supreme Court's ruling invalidating implementation of the Brady
Act has opened a new chapter on the debate of federalism. This
decision has provided the strongest evidence yet of the ascension of
212Greenhouse, supra,note 19.
213Printz,

117 S. Ct. at 2405 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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power at the Supreme Court. There was much confusion among the
Court about the nature and scope of state sovereignty limits on
Congressional power. Even the most recent opinion of the Court led
to opposite conclusions when applied to the Brady Act. Perhaps this
confusion will lead' to the loss of more lives as a result of gun
violence than it would have if the Brady Act had not been invalidated.
What remains is the true test: whether the Court's decision will be
beneficial to the individual people of the states. We must not
overlook the notion that our system of dual sovereignty is in place to
protect the people of the states. It is the people who are directly
affected by the outcome of the Supreme Court's ruling, hence, it is the
people who are to be protected by the decisions which the judiciary
makes. Many questions remain such as the effect the Court's decision
will have on the protection afforded to the people by the government,
the extent to which the voice of the common man is heard, the effect
on other federally implemented programs at state levels and the
willingness of the states to voluntarily participate in the
implementation of the Brady Act. The Supreme Court's decision to
invalidate the Brady Act will affect many lives; perhaps on a more
humane level than ever expected by the Court.
Nearly three decades ago, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. warned
us that the easy accessibility of guns and the rising tide of gun
violence had "created an atmosphere in which violence and hatred
'
have become popular pastimes."214
A few short years later, after Dr.
King's assassination, Robert Kennedy said, "with all the violence and
murder and killings we've had in the United States. ..we must keep
'
firearms from people who have no business with guns." 215
A few

weeks later, after Robert Kennedy's assassination, President Lyndon
Johnson said: "What in the name of conscience will it take to pass a
truly effective gun control law? Now, in this new hour of tragedy, let
'
us spell out our grief in constructive action."216
Bianca Soprano

214

LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER'S QUOTATIONS 231 (1977).

213Id.
216

id.

